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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the extent to which governmentality provides a 
critical visibility of the economy beyond its liberal imaginary. It argues that Fou-
cault’s conceptual and historical understanding of liberal governmentality has two 
traits that encumber a de-centering of the economy from a Foucauldian perspective. 
The first obstacle results from a persistent asymmetry of the concept of governmen-
tality as it remains solely geared towards replacing the monolithic account of the 
state. Governmentality is therefore in danger of rendering the economic invisible in-
stead of advancing an analytics of power appropriate to the specificity of this field. 
The second impediment relates to how Foucault reads the invisibility of the econo-
my asserted in liberal discourse. While Foucault emphasizes how the “invisible 
hand” imparts a critical limitation towards the sovereign hubris of total sight, the 
paper unearths a more complex politics of truth tied to the invisible economy. Draw-
ing on selected historical material, the papers shows that the liberal invisibility of the 
economy rather functions as a prohibitive barrier towards developing novel and crit-
ical visibilities of the economy. A Foucauldian perspective on economy, the paper 
concludes, benefits from piercing through this double invisibility of the economy.  
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I. Promises of Governmentality 
 
A profound re-articulation of the political and economic realm lies at the heart of the 
notion of governmentality. Through the lenses of governmentality, the economy ap-
pears as an inextricable part of modern political rationalities. Foucault’s aspiration to 
deconstruct the “cold monster” of the state led him—however inadvertently—to en-
gage simultaneously with notions of the market, the economy and economic man. In 
doing so, he changed the very nature of these categories. Divested of their epistemo-
logical claims, these categories become intelligible as elaborations of liberal political 
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rationalities of governing. In effect, Foucault has taken up two “cold monsters” at 
the same time: the economy and the state.  
This article focuses on the simultaneous undoing of the inherited discourses 
on the economy and the state that Foucault proposes. It takes the crossing of 
boundaries between the economic and the political to be one of the most innovative 
and intriguing aspects of the concept of governmentality. It is not doubted that Fou-
cault offers powerful tools and tremendous insights for posing and commencing 
such a simultaneous de-centring of the state and the economy. But how far, this pa-
per asks, does the concept of governmentality answer to the insightful theoretical 
agenda it implicitly and explicitly contains? Is the concept of governmentality useful 
for challenging the prevalent conceptualization of the economy to the same extent as 
that of the state? Unfortunately, as this article seeks to demonstrate, governmentality 
does not keep the promise to undo both of these “cold monsters” at the same time. 
In crucial ways, the conceptual architecture of governmentality stays strongly wed-
ded to the de-centring of the state, while the economy remains shielded from becom-
ing the proper object of a Foucauldian “analytics of power.”1 The economy becomes 
therefore, as it will be argued, in an important and critical sense analytically invisi-
ble.2 Despite Foucault’s critical re-reading of economic discourse, the market ulti-
mately remains for him, as for liberalism itself, a space of invisibility, populated by 
interested subjects, who are governed by the conditioning of their choices. One 
hopes in vain for an analytics of the malleable forms of temporality, spatiality and 
valuation inherent in the economic; Foucault provides us with no Economic Order of 
Things, which would follow the epistemological authorities, legal frames and spaces 
of comparison, which organize sociality through objects and money. Instead, the 
governmental re-articulation of the economy ultimately leads us back to what turns 
out to be a familiar liberal imaginary of the market.3
The vantage point for measuring and problematizing the contended invisible 
economy is provided by Foucault’s ethos of investigation itself. As is well known, 
this ethos of investigation furthers two related analytical tasks: to pierce through the 
  
                                                 
1  For Foucault’s uses of this notion see Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. An Intro- 
duction. Volume I (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 82. 
2  This article takes the two lecture courses, Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of  
Biopolitics as its main references, for the simple reason that they feature most prominently 
the question of economy as part of an analysis of relations of power (Michel Foucault: Se-
curity, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78. (Houndsmill, ENG: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) and Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the 
Collège de France 1978-79 (Houndsmill, ENG: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)).  
3  For the necessity of probing deeper into Foucault’s account of economy and liberalism  
see also William Walters, “Decentering the Economy.” Economy and Society, 28, 2 (1999): 
312-323. His argument concentrates more on how governmentality fails to properly ac-
count for the birth of “the economy” as a distinct field of reality. Ricardo, rather than 
Adam Smith, should be the proper anchor for such a discursive emergence. 
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“systems of veridiction” and to unfold a novel and critical visibility of the social, in 
which the lines of force and their fragility are brought to the surface.4 By calling 
himself a “cartographer”, Foucault emphasizes the importance of producing novel 
and critical visibilities—a status which Gilles Deleuze affirms in his homage to his 
friend.5 As such, Foucault exposes a profound commitment to visibility, understood 
as the effect of a critical operation.6
The argument pursued here contains two parts, both of which deal with the 
question of how the economy and its discourse are opened to an “analytics of 
power” and contextualized within a “politics of truth” through an analytics of gov-
ernmentality.
 The following argument takes this ethos of inves-
tigation and this quest for critical visibility as its vantage point for problematizing 
the protracted invisibility of the economy within governmentality.  
7
                                                 
4  The relevant part reads as follows: “Déchiffer une strate de réalité de manière telle qu’en 
émergent les lignes de forces et de fragilité; les points de résistance et les points 
d’attaques possible, les voies tracées et les chemins de traverse. C’est une réalité de lutes 
possible que je cherche à faire apparaitre.” (Michel Foucault, Dits et Écrits II, 1976-1988 
(Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 633). See also Wendy Brown’s account of genealogy for a discus-
sion of this understanding of knowledge-production (Wendy Brown, “Genealogical Poli-
tics,” in The Later Foucault: Politics and Philosophy, ed. Jeremy Moss (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage, 1998), 45).  
5  He does so in an interview with Les Nouvelles Littéraires titled “Sur la sellette”, in March  
1975 (Michel Foucault, Dits et Écrits I, 1954-1975. (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 1588). De-
leuze’s account of Foucault centers on this cartographic project. He speaks of ‘making see 
and making hear’ what is determining our regimes of visibility and sayability (Gilles De-
leuze, Foucault (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1986), 42). That Foucault wanted the know-
ledge he produces to have a tactical and strategic use and had thus to present strategic 
links and accounts of forces is a persistent theme in his interviews, lectures and writings. 
See, for example, the lecture of January 7 in his lecture course Society must be defended 
(Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, ed. 
Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, (New York: Picador, 2003).  
6  The argument against the “hermeneutics of suspicion” as marshaled by Paul Ricoeur is  
based on showing and exposing the superficiality of things in an “overview, from higher 
and higher up, which allows the depth to be laid out in front of him in a more and more 
profound visibility; depth is resituated as an absolutely superficial secret,” as Foucault 
put it in an early work, Nietzsche, Freud, Marx (Foucault 1967, cit. in Hubert L. Dreyfus 
and Paul Rabinow. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Second Edi-
tion. With an afterword by and an interview with Michel Foucault, (Chicago, IL: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1983), 107).  
7  Foucault defined his form of doing philosophy as analyzing the politics of truth: “How- 
ever, in one way or another, and for simple factual reasons, what I am doing is some-
thing that concerns philosophy, that is to say, the politics of truth, for I do not see many 
other definitions of the word ‘philosophy; apart from this” (Foucault, Security, Territory, 
Population, 3). 
 Throughout, the particular articulation of the political sphere and 
economic discourse is paramount for understanding the invisibility of the economy. 
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The first part argues that the economy remains invisible because a persistent asym-
metry in the concept of governmentality privileges the state vis-à-vis the economy as 
the object of a Foucauldian critique. The economy never becomes an object of analy-
sis in its own right; therefore the mediation of relations of power through money 
and objects drops from view. Consequently, the specificity of this distinct, yet im-
pure form of ordering, that we refer to as economic, disappears. Despite the aspira-
tion of governmentality to a simultaneous examination of the reciprocity and co-
constitution of economic and political discourses, the concept of governmentality 
itself remains asymmetrical in its aim and critical weight. The first reason, then, for 
the persistent invisibility of the economy within governmentality research, derives 
from the failure of the concept to properly address the political within the economic. 
The second reason for the lack of critical visibility of the economy leads us to a dis-
cussion of how Foucault understands the “politics of truth” implied within eco-
nomic discourse. The main point of contention is Foucault’s reading of the “invisible 
hand”. According to this reading, the liberal understanding of the invisible economy 
amounts to an epistemological limit posited against the aspiration of an “economic 
sovereign”: it disturbs critically any presumption to see a social totality from a single 
vantage point.8 This reading of the invisible market has its merits, but attends only 
insufficiently to the political problematique at stake in seeing the market as a space of 
invisibility. The pervasive trope of invisibility is equally invested in regulating the 
regimes of visibility circulating throughout the social body itself, determining what 
can legitimately be rendered visible, and how. A more thorough genealogy of this 
trope demonstrates that liberalism itself is in fact divided in respect to the politics of 
visibility—a point that largely escapes Foucault’s genealogy of liberalism. Foucault, 
who is usually inclined to demonstrate the “dispersion” and “minute deviations” 
underneath a unified tradition, has unwittingly glossed over these differing liberal-
isms and the multiple politics of invisibility.9 Too quickly, the invisibility of the 
economy is taken as a “tool for the criticism of reality,”10
In a sense, Foucault’s account of the economy has never outgrown the reluctance 
with which he engaged this issue. Questions of economy were never Foucault’s pri-
mary concern; he rather aimed at circumventing and disturbing them. Since his early 
 rather than as a machine for 
seeing, whose epistemological privileges, lines of exclusion and technologies of 
knowledge need to be dissected.  
 
II.  Asymmetrical Views—Seeing like a State 
 
                                                 
8  Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 283. 
9  Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” In Language, Counter-Memory, Practice:  
Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault, ed. Donald Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1977), 146. 
10  Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. 320. 
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writings, the struggle against the dominance of a Marxist form of economism led 
him to establish his project to study power, conduct, subjectivity and truth as a field 
clearly distinguishable and set aside from the study of economic relations proper.11 
Of course, he never denied that relations of power should not be understood as an 
additional layer within the socio-economic field.12 They reside instead in the very 
interstices of other relations: “Mechanisms of power are an intrinsic part of all these 
relations […]”.13 Nevertheless, such relations continue to possess their own density 
and distinctively non-economic imperatives as they are directed to shape the “con-
duct of conduct”, and call forth their own struggles and resistances: “These ‘revolts 
of conduct’ have their specificity: they are distinct from political or economic revolts 
in their objective and form.”14 Whenever Foucault uses the notion of economy him-
self, this usage is usually a quite deliberate and strategic transposition of its meaning 
into the field of power, playing with and countering the Marxist tradition: hence, he 
speaks of “the economy of power”15 or power as a “political economy of the body” 
as in Discipline and Punish.16 The materialist anchor usually associated with the econ-
omy is transposed into the notion of the governing of life—presented as a govern-
mental rather than an economic problematic.17
It is therefore justified to say that governmentality, however unwittingly, 
proposes a simultaneous reading of the constitution of both the economic and the 
 It is thus in a way apt to say that Fou-
cault circumvents rather than takes up the issue of economy in his attempt to dis-
lodge the economistic and totalizing strands of the Marxist tradition. The lectures at 
the College de France, in which he developed his notion of governmentality, con-
tinue with this strategic evasion. As indicated before, this time the circumvention led 
paradoxically into the heart of economy. Transposing the question of the state into a 
question of rationalities and technologies of governing entangled his argument in 
economic discourses. Instead of the commonly assumed quasi-ontological difference 
between the economy and the political horizon, Foucault suggests that an unbroken 
plane of governmental strategies and reflections envelop both spheres. Hence, he 
firmly treaded onto the territory of the economy itself, with the consequence of dis-
turbing its shape. 
                                                 
11  Foucault, Dits et Écrits II, 629. 
12  Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, in ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow,  
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Second Edition (Chicago, IL: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1983), 218. 
13  Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 2. See also his elaborations of his analytics of  
power in an interview with Pasquale Pasquino in 1978 “Precisazioni sul potere. Riposta 
ad alcuni critici” (Foucault, Dits et Écrits II, 625ff.). 
14  Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 196. 
15  Foucault, Dits et Écrits II, 631. 
16  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books,  
1995). 
17  See paradigmatically the last chapter in Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 140f. 
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political. In this respect, Foucault comes close to a certain theoretical program for 
which Bruno Latour has long argued, which asks for going beyond the traditional 
divisions assumed by modernity by unearthing their common and entangled consti-
tution.18 What Latour suggests in respect to the division between society and nature, 
Foucault suggests implicitly for the economic and the political sphere.19
Foucault suggests that the emergence of the modern meaning of economy as 
a “level of reality” should not be understood as the mere effect of a presumed differ-
entiation of the economy into a functionally coherent subsystem of society.
 But while 
Foucault might pose the question of the symmetrical making and envisioning of 
economy and politics, his concept of governmentality retains a thoroughly asym-
metrical structure. For understanding this asymmetrical nature and the limits it en-
tails, we need to briefly revisit the basic elements of Foucault’s discussion of econ-
omy from the perspective of governmentality.  
20 Instead, 
it belongs to a political problematization of a particular rationality of governing that 
aims at the social body as a whole. Foucault thus sees the conceptualization of econ-
omy as part of the “episode in the mutation of technologies of power and an episode 
in the instalment of this technique of apparatuses of security that seems to me to be 
one of the typical features of modern societies.”21 These technologies take the popu-
lation as their main target of intervention.22 Security, Population and Government—
this series defined modern politics for Foucault. The knowledge and rationalities of 
economy prominently underlie this series.23
The novel conceptualization of economy as a self-regulated reality and the 
birth of the new collective subject of the population are, Foucault maintains at vari-
ous points, inextricably tied together in their common function of framing new ob-
jects, technologies and techniques of governing.
  
24
                                                 
18  Bruno Latour, "Postmodern? No, Simply Amodern! Steps Towards an Anthropology of  
Science," Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 21, 1 (1990): 145-171. 
19  Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,  
1993), 13ff. 
20  Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 95. 
21  Ibid., 34. 
22  Ibid., 64f; 95. 
23  Ibid., 76f. 
24  The differentiation between the notion of technique and technologies in Foucault is noto- 
riously indeterminate. In his lecture-course, Foucault suggests understanding technolo-
gies of power as the very “complex edifice” or “system of correlation”, in which different 
specific techniques—as for example the “disciplinary techniques of putting someone in a 
cell”—are aligned. While the history of techniques is precise and long-winded, the his-
tory of technologies is the “more fuzzy history of correlations” defining the “dominant 
feature” (Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 8).  
 Evolving in tandem, the modern 
concept of economy divests the object of population from the cameralist techniques 
of the policey, with their administrative logic of minute control and encyclopaedic 
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knowledge.25 At the same time, the concept of population pushes the meaning of 
economy outside of the narrow confines of the household. No longer referring to the 
proper administration of the oikos or the prudential advice of saving on means, 
economy projects a new social ontology: a plane of circulatory flows, naturalness 
and internal forces, forging a complex causal intermeshing between a milieu and its 
population.”26 It is therefore the problem of circulation and causality that is at stake 
in this notion of milieu…The milieu, then, will be that in which circulation is carried 
out. The milieu is a set of natural givens—rivers, marshes, hills—and a set of artifi-
cial givens—an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etcetera. The milieu is a cer-
tain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it.”27
Resolving this question requires a discussion of Foucault’s somewhat incom-
plete analysis of the technologies and techniques of the security-dispositif.
 Very 
prominently, the notion of the milieu and its circulatory structure articulate the 
population as a composite figure comprising natural circumstances, habits, urban 
settings or laws inter alia. Political economy thus appears as a form of knowledge in-
tegral to a new dispositif, whose outlines ignore the usual division maintained be-
tween the economy and the political sphere.  
The conception of economy is thus firmly positioned within the field of gov-
ernmental reason and technique. To what extent does this transposition allow a con-
ceptualization of the economy and economic practices—now loosely referring to the 
specificity of modes of ordering which rest upon the mediation through by money, 
objects, valuations—as framed and shaped by a security-dispositif? Asking this ques-
tion is not a play on words, rather it posits and tests the viability of the security-
dispositif to function as a symmetrical analytical device capable of equally dislodging 
both the state and the market. In other words: Does the discourse on economy suc-
ceed only in elaborating the new dispositif of power, being itself exclusively geared 
toward the re-articulation of the state? Or does it allow the development of a chal-
lenging analytical perspective on the economy capable of addressing it in its specific-
ity?  
28 The out-
line, he presents, juxtaposes the security-dispositif with disciplinary techniques in 
terms of their organization of space, time and norms.29
                                                 
25  Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 323f and 328. 
26  Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 94; 30f; 45. 
27  Ibid., 21. 
28  The cursory explication of the security-dispositif by Foucault has given rise to the com- 
plaint that Foucault’s analytical strategies focus too much on purely theoretical or textual 
material (Pat O’Malley, Lorna Weir and Clifford Shearing, “Governmentality, Criticism, 
Politics,” Economy and Society, 26, 4 (1997): 501-517). The question posed here has a differ-
ent concern: it inquires about the fecundity of inspiration, which Foucault’s analysis con-
tains for developing a richer, more detailed or more material account. 
29  Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 44f. 
 The space of the security-
dispositif is no longer organized within the cells and grids of discipline, neither does 
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it rely on the temporality of homogeneous units of time, or impose the norms of dis-
ciplinary conduct on the individual body. Instead, it assumes a given milieu of circu-
lation, it assumes the aleatory occurrences of events, and it derives its norms from 
statistical regularities calculated on the level of the population. It is, Foucault con-
cludes, an “idea of a government of men that would think first of all and fundamen-
tally of the nature of things and no longer of men’s evil nature.”30
Foucault’s analysis of this dispositif is not comparable to the dense materiality 
and detail he marshalled in describing the dispositif of sexuality or the disciplinary 
arrangements of visibility, knowledge and sanctions. Still, his cursory remarks on 
this subject are inspiring because they call attention to the ordering of spatiality, 
temporality and norms as unique aspects of economic regimes of circulation. But de-
spite his invocations of the economic as modulated by a specific dispositif of organiz-
ing time, space and economic norms, this line of research is not pursued consistently 
through his investigations. The analytics of the security-dispositif are not geared to-
wards understanding the circulation of things and money. They do not point to-
wards unearthing what might be called an “economic order of things” in its epis-
temic, juridical, spatial and strategic dimensions, and in terms of their unique effects. 
Today, as genetic engineering, intellectual property regulation, derivatives and 
techniques of transplantations refashion the very ontology, obligations and meas-
urements tied to the order of things, the omission of these orders becomes even more 
accentuated. Instead, Foucault directs our attention to the interplay between a milieu 
and the wills and interests of the subjects by which “one tries to affect the popula-
tion.”
  
31 Certainly, as Foucault states, within the security-dispositif, the “multiplicity 
of individuals is no longer pertinent, the population is.”32 However, the individual 
still plays a decisive role in his analysis of the economic government of population 
“to the extent that, properly managed, maintained and encouraged, it will make 
possible what one wants to obtain at the level that is pertinent.”33 Although the 
population had been introduced as a composite figure including things and spatial 
settings, this figure becomes more and more a composite of sentient, willing and in-
terested individuals responding with their calculations to given incentives.34
                                                 
30  Ibid., 49. 
31  Ibid., 21. 
32  Ibid., 42. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Stuart Elden has discussed how territoriality has elapsed from the analytical perspective,  
while being so prominently featured within the very title of the lecture-course: Security, 
Territory, Population. He argues that this omission might be remedied within the very 
framework proposed by Foucault, but remarks nevertheless this curious obliteration, at 
the cost of an exclusive account of population analytically separated from territoriality 
(Stuart Elden, “Government, Calculation, Territory,” Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space, 25 (2007): 562-580). 
 The 
“conduct of conduct” through the manipulation of interest becomes the single most 
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important key for rendering this dispositif analytically intelligible. As a consequence, 
the analytical visibility given to the market-economy in Foucault’s perspective in-
creasingly resembles the well-known outlines of the prevalent liberal understanding 
of the economy. Sifting through his lectures, one finds the following all too familiar 
imaginary of the (market) economy as part and parcel of the governmental re-
articulation: it is a bounded space of circulation, it answers to the forces of reality 
itself, it is regulated through incentives. It is about exchange or competition and it is 
situated—repeating the usual oppositions—vis-à-vis the interventionist welfare 
state. Traditionally, Foucault’s genealogies and archaeologies have drawn their ana-
lytical power from a disruption of the known oppositions and options, already pre-
figured at the surface of dominant discourses. In respect to the question of economy, 
governmentality appears to fall short in attaining this expected “Foucault-Effect”.  
It seems, then, that one is confronted with an asymmetrical conceptual anat-
omy of the security-dispositif: the discourse on economy elucidates a specific rational-
ity of the security-dispositif, which contains plausible suggestions for thinking of the 
state “without entrails”, while the elaboration of this dispositif fails to elucidate the 
order of the economic itself, or, as I have tentatively put it, the economic order of 
things. A limit appears in how the elaboration of the techniques of governmentality 
can indeed function as a complete heuristic to displace effectively and productively 
the implicit universality of both the state and the market—which is not to say that it 
does not re-articulate the economy to a certain extent. Detecting these specific gov-
ernmental strategies in different lieux sociaux, including firms, consumer programs 
or bureaucracies, exposes how deeply this type of power is enmeshed within economic 
forms. Nevertheless, Foucault’s approach is capable of identifying only those strate-
gies of governing that operate through incentives, without successfully conceptualis-
ing the economy beyond its liberal imaginary. Wendy Brown’s statement—that the 
governmental account of neo-liberal strategies is not about the economy—while 
foregrounding the market, is more fitting than one might have hoped.35
At the end of the two courses at the Collège de France, Foucault summarizes 
his “interpretation” of liberalism” as having pointed out those “types of rationality 
that are implemented in the methods by which human conduct is directed through a 
state administration.”
  
36 It is certainly surprising and misleading that Foucault re-
stricts the scope of his analysis to “state administration”. But Foucault’s approach 
signals the awareness of the specificity of governmentality as it remains geared to-
ward dissecting the modes of “seeing like a state”—borrowing here somewhat po-
lemically the famous title by Scott.37
                                                 
35  Wendy Brown, “Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy.” Theory and Event, 7,  
3 (2003). http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/tae/v007/7.1brown.html#copyright (accessed June 
16, 2008). 
36  Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 322. 
37  James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
 Given that technologies of governing emanate 
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throughout the social body, this allegation is misleading. But it captures nevertheless 
the asymmetrical weight of the concept of governmentality. The point of contention 
in respect to how Foucault draws the question of economy into the orbit of political 
reason is not directed against the political horizon he spans over the economy. The 
point of contention I am advancing here lies in how he does it: unearthing “the po-
litical” in economic forms of ordering could and should mean, from a Foucauldian 
perspective, the development of an “analytics of power” appropriate to the specific-
ity of this field. But within governmentality, it means to excavate the economic, with 
neither the mediations of relations through money or objects being fully addressed. 
It is in this sense that the economy remains invisible within the political perspective 
of governmentality.  
 
III.  Tropes of Invisibility—Seeing like a Market 
 
The invisibility of the economy is not only an unwitting effect of Foucault’s elabora-
tion of the security-dispositif, it is also explicitly encoded within the genealogy of the 
economic discourse that Foucault presents in his analysis. The invisible hand plays a 
paramount and paradigmatic role in Foucault’s account of the liberal politics of 
truth: key to this governmental interpretation of the invisible hand is the dispersion 
of the epistemological authority it enforces, and its effect in undermining the author-
ity of the sovereign. But Foucault’s reading fails to account fully for the political prob-
lematique of visibility and invisibility in the social body; hence only a partial and one-
sided genealogy of the invisible hand emerges, one which privileges the critical 
function of the invisible hand while underestimating the limitations imposed by this 
trope. The question of what is determined as invisible or visible in respect to the so-
cial body, and to whom such visibility is accorded, has a far wider political texture 
than Foucault is capable of conveying in his lectures. Furthermore, this wider politi-
cal texture correlates with the inner differences of the liberal tradition—a tradition 
that, as McClure exemplifies in respect to John Locke, has always been guided and 
disquieted by questions of knowledge and criteria of judgement.38
                                                                                                                                                 
Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 
38  Kirstie McClure, Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent, (Ithaca, NY: Cor- 
nell University Press, 1996), 63; 69. 
 Liberalism itself is 
not unified in respect to the “politics of truth” inscribed within the visible hand. In 
order to draw out these intrinsic differences within what passes as a purportedly 
unified liberal tradition, the following discussion draws, if only cursorily, on histori-
cal select material. On the one hand, it takes up the short-lived radical democratic-
liberal thought of the eighteenth century (exemplified by Thomas Paine or Marquis 
de Condorcet), and, on the other, it refers to the work of Friedrich A. Hayek, who 
presents an important strand of liberalism prominent since the nineteenth century. 
This division between strands of liberalism are not reducible to the historical gap 
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that divides them. Neither do these strands correlate with the distinction between 
liberalism and neo-liberalism that Foucault discusses more prominently. Rather, 
they foreground a difference within the politics of truth implicit within the liberal 
tradition that has becomes particularly virulent at the end of the eighteenth century, 
but exceeds this historical moment. Still, incorporating this particular historical mo-
ment is instructive, as Foucault knew, when he chronicled the break between the 
classical and modern episteme at the turn of centuries in The Order of Things. Curi-
ously, for his account of liberal governmentality, this break plays no role. What he 
disperses in The Order of Things, notably the discursive shifts in political economy, 
remains surprisingly unified in the genealogy of the liberal account of economy he 
offers in his studies of governmentality.39
The question of visibility and its related epistemology is central to how Fou-
cault related the concept of economy to the liberal rationalization of government. 
Foucault sought to understand the very boundary between the spheres of politics 
and economy as a specific epistemological construction: “Political economy was im-
portant, even in its theoretical formulation, inasmuch as (and only inasmuch as, but 
this is clearly a great deal) it points out to the government where it had to go to find 
the principle of truth of its own governmental practice.”
 Pinpointing these inconsistencies is not 
merely an exercise in scholarly erudition: these differences correlate with differences 
in the “politics of truth” contained in the liberal tradition itself, and for this reason 
their absence constitutes critical omissions. In order to recover these differences, an 
explication of the trope of the invisible hand, as seen through Foucault’s limited 
analysis, is required.  
40 The decisive issue is not 
this or that particular economic theory or fact, nor does this truth exist within “the 
heads of economists.”41
The link established by liberalism between the truth of the market and the ra-
tionalities of governing does not constitute a straightforward relation. Key to liberal-
 Instead, of paramount importance is the very structure of 
association established between political reason and truth. Political reason and the 
sphere of politics are within liberalism, according to Foucault, tied to the market as a 
“court of veridiction”.  
                                                 
39  Adam Smith, who assumed in the former account a middling position between the mod- 
ern and the classical age, turns later into a paradigmatic figure for the modern liberal po-
litical rationality. Also, the modern “finitude of men” Foucault diagnoses in the Order of 
Things is not properly translated into his account of governmentality. Attending to this 
shift towards finitude might help to provide answers to the question of the relation be-
tween biopolitics and economy—which is not sufficiently addressed by Foucault. See Ul-
rich Bröckling, Menschenökonomie, Humankapital. Eine Kritik der biopolitischen Öko-
nomie,“ in Disziplinen des Lebens. Zwischen Anthropologie, Literatur und Politik, ed. Ulrich 
Bröckling et al. (Tübingen, GER: Gunter Narr Verlag, 2004) for an argument about the 
missing link between biopolitics and economy.  
40  Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 32. 
41  Ibid., 30. 
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ism is the paradoxical nature of this relation as it refers political reason to an object 
of knowledge that remains invisible. The economy, in other words, defies the aspira-
tions to know, resulting in a paradoxical epistemological ground. Paradigmatically, 
the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith stands for this disruption of the authority of a 
sovereign vision; it articulates the impossibility of seeing the whole of society from a 
single vantage point. The singular most important point in respect to this invisibility 
is the limit of power it produces, according to Foucault. The following words, which 
Foucault puts into the mouth of the homo oeconomicus in a fictitious dialogue with the 
juridical sovereign, nicely exemplify this stance: “He also tells the sovereign: You 
must not. But why must he not? You must not because you cannot. And you cannot 
in the sense that “you are powerless”. And why are you powerless, why can’t you? 
You cannot because you do not know and you do not know because you cannot 
know.”42
Therefore, the figure of the invisible economy has a pivotal role for the dis-
cursive initiation of these limits and their governmental effects. Foucault distin-
guishes on this ground between liberal political rationality proper and its 
Physiocratic predecessor. The Physiocrats, Foucault emphasizes, referred political 
reason not to an invisible economy, but, on the contrary, they procured a tableau 
économique, which enabled a sovereign vision over the whole. The truth of the socio-
economic body, transparent to sovereign eyes, was to guide the decision of the sov-
ereign, without dislodging him. Liberalism proper, on the other hand, according to 
Foucault, begins by asserting a barred vision of the social body.
  
43 At several places 
throughout these lectures, Foucault describes economic thought as the very discur-
sive stronghold that establishes such limits, which is in fundamental ways also an 
epistemological limit. Hence, in contrast to the wisdom of political philosophy, Fou-
cault thus ties liberalism—in its essential aspects—not to the form of law, but to the 
discourse on economy.44 The “heretics” of the police-state with its “megalomaniacal 
and obsessive fantasy of a totally administered society”45 were, he points out, the 
economists as they posed a reality, which had its own density and naturalness: “[…] 
It was the économistes who mounted a critique of the police state in terms of the even-
tual or possible birth of a new art of government.46
                                                 
42  Ibid., 283. 
43  Ibid., 285f. 
44  To be precise, one has to add that Foucault’s argument here is strictly historical, as politi- 
cal economy as a form of knowledge is not liberal “either by virtue or nature” (Foucault, 
The Birth of Biopolitics, 321). For a more extensive discussion of the relation between law 
in its function as a limit and the interpellation of the economy as a natural limit, see the 
lecture from 17 January 1979 (Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics).  
45  Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, “Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Gov- 
ernment,” British Journal of Sociology, 43, 2 (1992): 189. 
46  Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 347. 
 The discourse on economy, with 
its attending notions of circulatory flows, milieus, interests and aleatory occurrences, 
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defies any aspiration to govern directly, minutely and en detail—to the same extent 
that it made the sovereign vision over these processes impossible: “The possibility of 
limitation and the question of truth are both introduced into governmental reason 
through political economy:”47 “I think that fundamentally it was political economy 
that made it possible to ensure the self-limitation of governmental reason.”48
We have thus arrived at the heart of Foucault’s reading of the trope of the invisibility 
of the economy: The essential and politically relevant understanding of the famous 
“invisible hand” centres on the very restriction it imposes on the sovereign hubris to 
know and to rule the whole of society and its economy from a central position. With 
an almost surprising verve, Foucault elaborates this point after having drawn paral-
lels between the limits Kant imposed on the proper uses of pure reason on the one 
hand, and the self-limitation of political reason enacted by political economy on the 
other:
  
49 “Thus the economic world is naturally opaque and naturally non-totalizable. 
It is originally and definitely constituted from a multiplicity of points of view […] 
economics is an atheistic discipline; economics is a discipline without God; econom-
ics is a discipline without totality; economics is a discipline that begins to demon-
strate not only the pointlessness, but also the impossibility of a sovereign point of 
view over the totality of the state he has to govern.”50
This account of the invisibility of the economy as an impossibility of a sover-
eign perspective is certainly kindred to the critiques of modern epistemological au-
thority and claims to universality presented by post-structuralism, feminism and 
post-colonial theory. The sovereign ‘view from nowhere’ is de-authorized by refer-
ence to the multifarious and limited perspectives within the depth of the social body. 
Hence, a certain proximity and fondness colours Foucault’s account of the trope of 
 It is the invisible economy that 
provides the tool for this limitation.  
                                                 
47  Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 17. 
48  Ibid., 13. 
49  The comparison reads as follows: “Kant too, a little later moreover, had to tell man that  
he cannot know the totality of the world. Well, some decades earlier, political economy 
had told the sovereign: Not even you can know the totality of the economic process. 
There is no sovereign in economics. There is no economic sovereign. This is a very impor-
tant point in the history of economic thought, certainly, but also and above all in the his-
tory of governmental reason“(Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 283). 
50  Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 282. The invisible hand is thus essential to liberalism,  
which is, Foucault contends, pre-occupied with the question of limited or frugal govern-
ment and can be defined “as a technology of government whose objective is its own self-
limitation […]” (Ibid., 319). It is haunted by the constant question of why to govern at all 
and subjects itself to the incessant critique of its own, [...] I would be inclined to see in 
liberalism a form of critical reflection on governmental practice (Ibid., 321). The theme of 
limited government and the motif of critique circumscribe, according to Foucault, the 
Janus face of liberalism: as an elaboration of mostly indirect forms of rule - which might 
paradoxically turn out to be quite extensive - and as a “tool for the criticism of real-
ity”(Ibid., 320). 
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invisibility. This fondness might never have stopped him from telling a story of lib-
eralism that chronicles the mechanisms undercutting this announced ethos of de-
limitation. But the present argument is less concerned with the merits of Foucault’s 
analysis of liberalism tout court, than with the particular reading of the invisibility of 
the economy and its theoretical effects and omissions.  
That this reading omits decisive aspects can be perceived by revisiting the 
historical record. A reworked genealogical perspective provides the clues for un-
earthing a much wider political problematique of visibility than Foucault’s narrative 
presents. Emma Rothschild’s history of Economic Sentiments draws our attention to-
wards the contested tropes of invisibility at the end of the eighteenth century. It is a 
time at which, she emphasizes, the boundaries between the economic and political 
spheres were far from clearly drawn.51 The turn towards the nineteenth century, in 
the wake of the French Revolution, was rife with intense contestations of how and to 
whom the social was visible. The political problematique at stake revolved in a much 
more general sense around the uncertainty of vision within a situation defined by 
the intense questioning of inherited structures of authority at a time of political up-
heaval. In contrast, if one follows Foucault’s account, one would expect the major 
difference within the liberal tradition to reside between the nineteenth century and 
the neoliberalism of the twentieth century respectively. But a more careful genea-
logical account, which intends to uncover the contestations, struggles and “the ap-
propriations of vocabulary,”52 would find rather, that such fissures were pertinent 
and present around 1800, when economic reason did not yet pose a strict limit for 
the exercise of its counterpart.53 Sheldon Wolin has remarked how easily these dif-
ferences in liberalism seem to slip from attention.54
                                                 
51  Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments. Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment,  
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 50. 
52  Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, and Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, Histo- 
ry”, 154f. 
53  Rothschild, 38f. 
54  Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought. 
Expanded Edition, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 263. Sheldon Wolin 
is more inclined to take such differences not as internal to liberalism, but as signaling two 
different traditions easily “lumped together”: democratic radicalism and liberalism. 
Thomas Paine would belong to the former, whereas Adam Smith to the latter. Emma 
Rothschild tries to draw out the differences between Adam Smith and the liberalism of 
the nineteenth century, which was ever more inclined to secure the foundations of un-
questioned (epistemological) order. These differences are here accounted for as they help 
to distinguish the differences in respect to the politics of visibility or invisibility. But of 
course, it is important to keep in mind that Adam Smith and David Hume’s skepticism 
towards the democratization of judgment was profound.  
 But around the time of the 
French Revolution, they came to the fore in an intense contestation about the ques-
tions of seeing and knowing the socio-economic body. The following historical ma-
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terial does not only refer back to the end of the eighteenth century, it uses this mo-
ment to illustrate differences within liberalism between, on the one hand, thinkers 
such as Thomas Paine, Condorcet and to some extend Adam Smith, and on the 
other, Friedrich von Hayek.  
We learn from the historical record that the socio-economic body was not 
only, deemed invisible to the sovereign: the invisibility of society and its correlate 
blindness were also prominently attested to those newly attending the political 
stage, those who had but a limited “private stock of reason”, as Edmund Burke fa-
mously put it. It was allegedly they who could not see and to whom societal necessi-
ties and impending structures remained essentially invisible. Jacques Necker, Minis-
ter of Finance at the time, maintained that the people are like children, acting with-
out reflection, only enlightened by their instinct, as  “in all this immense space which 
is called the future… they never see more than tomorrow.”55 Similarly, Adam Fergu-
son complained that “every step and every movement of the multitude are made 
with equal blindness to the future.”56 Only guided by the immediacy of their own 
perceptions and failing to take the socio-economic rules properly into view, their po-
litical utterances lacked the intelligibility and vision necessary. “The mob”, as the 
famous scholar of population and economy Thomas Robert Malthus has put it, was 
“goaded by resentment for real sufferings but totally ignorant of the quarter from 
which they originate.”57 For that reason, they were easily led to “follow the chimeras 
of thought” and “flights of the imagination” and were easily “deceived by appear-
ances”. But of course, so were the philosophers and radical liberals, such as Thomas 
Paine, “who has shown himself totally unacquainted” with the structure of society.58
Foucault himself has suggested that any writing of the genealogy of knowl-
edge in this period has to do away with the binaries of enlightenment posed be-
tween blindness and sight, night and day, knowledge and ignorance. Rather, it 
should comprehend the extended struggle, not between knowledge and ignorance, 
but between different forms of knowledge.
 
Visibility and sight, blindness and ignorance, virtues and vices were attributed vari-
ously among the sovereign, the people, and those who allegedly deceived them with 
their theories. Hence, even such limited historical snapshots draw attention to the 
multiple, highly debated and heavily charged allegations with respect to claims of 
knowledge.  
59
                                                 
55  Cit. Rothschild, 39; 23. 
56  Ibid., 123. 
57  Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population. Sixth edition (London:  
William Pickering, 1986), 501; 494. 
58  Malthus, 526; 505. 
59  Foucault elaborates this in a discussion about philosophy and science and the disciplin- 
ing of knowledge. See the lecture of February 25 in the lecture course Foucault, Society 
must be Defended. 
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minimally, shows that undoing the hubris of sovereign knowledge and asserting a 
structural invisibility are two distinctive moves associated with invisibility and with 
different effects.  
One can observe a profound discursive break between the radical democratic 
liberals of the eighteenth century such as Thomas Paine or Condorcet and the subse-
quently dominant form of liberalism since the nineteenth century.60 To the latter, the 
social body appeared “frighteningly complex” and uncertain in all its overlapping 
relations.61 This socio-economic ontology of countless interdependencies defied the 
transparent tableau économique, just as Foucault would have expected. Yet, early lib-
eral political thought was busy producing certain forms of knowledge about the 
socio-economic body that would answer to this complexity. Condorcet coined the 
“social mathematics” in order to retrieve a probable truth amidst the uncertain and 
changing opinions, while always remaining cautious in respect to proposing a truth 
of society.62 Thomas Paine was equally busy determining a calculative and political 
knowledge about shares of civilisation to be distributed. It would be the task of a 
more thorough historical epistemology to unpack the “politics of truth” associated 
therewith. But more important for this discussion was the mere fact that neither a 
general nor structural invisibility of society was asserted, nor was a secure position 
from which to judge and to know ever assumed. They projected a “fatherless 
world”—using a term Rothschild coined—of unfounded and uncertain epistemo-
logical authority, but did not assume a barred vision in respect to the socio-economic 
complexity. Even Adam Smith, whose scepticism led him to assume that “politics is 
the ‘folly of man,’”63 did not venture to maintain the impossibility of any form of 
theoretical visibility of the socio-economic. As Rothschild argues convincingly, the 
assertion of the “invisible hand” had no deep prohibitive structure of vision in 
Smith. For Smith, as for Condorcet, Rothschild argues, the “enlightened disposition” 
was an uncertain condition. While no certain epistemological ground was to be had, 
it entailed theorization and envisioning.64
But the trope of invisibility did turn into a prohibitive bar to the envisioning 
of the socio-economic world later on. The liberalism of the nineteenth century, fil-
tered through the work of classical economists, was much more invested in estab-
 The “fatherless world” of uncertain 
judgements offered no sovereign or certain vision, but neither did it impose any spe-
cific prohibition on rendering the economic visible per se. 
                                                 
60  Wolin and Rothschild. 
61  Antoine-Nicolas de Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human 
Mind. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1955), 131. 
62  Johan Heilbron, The Rise of Social Theory, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota  
Press, 1995), 168, and Rothschild, 178f. 
63  Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interest: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its  
Triumph, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 104. 
64   Rothschild, 123. 
Foucault Studies, No 6, pp. 5-24. 
21 
 
lishing unquestioned foundations of order. Hayek’s liberalism, harking back more to 
Edmund Burke than to Thomas Paine (contrary to what Foucault’s historical narra-
tive makes believe) is paradigmatic for the simultaneous assertion of invisibility and 
foundation:65 it is the very invisibility of the whole which demands, according to 
Hayek, submission to those rules of conduct “that we have never made, and which 
we have never understood.”66 It is, he concedes, a “bitter necessity”, which is not 
easily accepted by a “hubristic reason.”67 The decisive moment of submitting to the 
assumed rules and regularities of the given is founded on the grounds of this essen-
tial invisibility.68 The extended order of the market answers to “that which far sur-
passes the reach of our understanding, wishes and purposes, and our sense percep-
tions, and that which incorporates and generates knowledge which no individual 
brain or any single organisation, could possess or invent.”69  Economics is for Hayek 
a meta-theory about the “dispersal of information”70
The paradox of the essential invisibility he posits lies not only in the wager-
ing between a critical impossibility to see and its prohibition. It also lies in the very 
 and hence it is the only form of 
knowledge that informs us of our own limits to know in productive ways. Hayek 
ties the impossibility of knowing the economy from a sovereign position to the pre-
scription of economics as the viable form of self-consciousness about this state of be-
ing; he intimately conjoins seemingly critical reflections about the limits of reason—
what Foucault associates with a Kantian operation—with a proscriptive ban on theo-
rization, that is, with the prohibition to envision the “extended order” (Hayek) in a 
different light.  
                                                 
65  For the relations between the founder of conservatism Edmund Burke and the form of  
neo-liberalism Hayek stands for, see Hayek’s own identification as an “old Whig”, draw-
ing parallels to Edmund Burke in the postscript The Constitution of Liberty titled "Why I 
Am Not a Conservative." (Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1960), 399f, 409). This title is misleading. Hayek argues against a 
conservatism that is indistinctively reluctant to any change. Thus, he attempts to distin-
guish himself, as well as Edmund Burke from a type of “Tory-conservatism” that tends 
to allow less experimentation than he would embrace. “I am as little a Tory-conservative 
as was Edmund Burke “ (Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Mysterious World of Trade and Mon-
ey“, in The Fatal Conceit. The Errors of Socialism. The Collected Works of Friedrich August 
Hayek, Vol 1. (London: Routledge, 1988), 53). For the intimate links between a form of po-
litical conservatism and this strand of liberalism, see also William Scheuerman, “The Un-
holy Alliance of Carl Schmitt and Friedrich A. Hayek,” Constellations, 4, 2 (1997)) and also 
John P. McCormick’s discussion of this type of conservatism (John P. McCormick, Carl 
Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1997), 303f). 
66  Hayek, “The Mysterious World of Trade and Money”, 14. 
67  Ibid. 64; 76.  
68  Ibid., 77. 
69  Ibid., 71. 
70  Ibid., 88. 
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reversal of the subject-positions of knowledge, which it effects. The general indict-
ment of the effort to see beyond the reach of one’s own interest has, as its underside, 
the construction of the market as a site where the social body becomes legible: “It is 
more than a metaphor”, asserts Hayek, “to describe the price system as a kind of 
machinery for registering change, or a system of telecommunications […]”.71 In 
Hayek’s account, it turns into a transmission belt for information, producing the 
amount of knowledge functional to the whole.72 “The whole acts as one market 
…because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that 
through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all […] 
The most significant fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with which 
it operates, of how little the individual participants need to know .…”73 Thus, the 
market is “like a telescope”, a tool for knowing the relevant, but it is itself neither 
understood, nor to be revised.74 Without letting the market assume this epistemo-
logical position, Hayek threatens, we might develop a “different type of civilization, 
like that state of termite ants”75 or will simply sacrifice the “nourishment of the exist-
ing multitudes of human beings.”76
In sum: omitting the dispersion within the discourse of liberalism may have 
led Foucault to embrace the invisibility of the economy with too much fondness. At-
tending to the different “politics of truth” related to the invisible economy requires 
simply a more extended Foucauldian genealogy. But it also requires an emphasis of 
   
Within this discursive construction, the market becomes the sole site legiti-
mately producing this knowledge of the whole. The invisibility of the market and the con-
struction of its epistemological authority go hand in hand. We have stumbled upon a 
familiar construction: Only that which does not exhibit its particularity can be as-
sumed to be universal; only an invisible market can promise viable sight. In this con-
text, the invisible hand is not just about defying the hubris of “economic sover-
eignty,” as Foucault put it. It is more about defying the forms of critical visibility 
commonly associated with Foucault’s work. The invisibility of the market is directed 
against the very analytical perspective Foucault typically assumes, one aimed at de-
tecting the instruments, positions, and architectures that produce such epistemologi-
cal claims and privileges. A more typical Foucauldian approach would commence to 
undo the invisibility of the economy and the market as an invisible “telescope” and 
“information-machine”. This would mean rendering visible the market’s own “ma-
chine of seeing”, rather than seeing like the unseen market itself. 
                                                 
71  Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, in The American Economic Review,  
Vol. 35(4), 1945: 527. 
72  Hayek, “The Mysterious World of Trade and Money”, 94. 
73  Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, 526f. 
74  Hayek, “The Mysterious World of Trade and Money”, 104. 
75  Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, 528. 
76  Hayek, “The Mysterious World of Trade and Money”, 100. 
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the lines of exclusion present in a discursive order, which Foucault is sometimes less 
adamant about.77
                                                 
77  For remedying this aspect, Judith Butler has always argued that the orders of discourse  
need to be prominently related to what is undone in their midst (Judith Butler, Bodies that 
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” (New York: Routledge, 1993), 8). Very similarly, 
Jacques Rancière stressed the divisions between what is rendered intelligible and what is 
delegated to mere noise. The political artifice resides in creating these divisions and or-
ders of the sensible, as he phrases it (Jacques Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” Theory & 
Event, 5, 3 (2001). http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.3ranciere.html 
(accessed June 16 2008)). 
 Searching for the political element within these figures of eco-
nomic discourse involves relating the surface of discourse itself to the positions and 
forms of seeing they provide. Governmentality is right for deciphering the political 
within the economic; it is right for positing a co-constitution of the world of politics 
and of economic categories and practices. But the task of deciphering the political 
and of understanding this common constitution exceeds the reach of this concept.  
 
IV.  Epilogue 
 
The foregoing discussion sought to engage the unfulfilled promise of governmental-
ity. The concept of governmentality promises to displace the hypostatizing catego-
ries of politics and economics with the critical visibility of the lines of force and the 
politics of truth. However inadvertently, it drew the economy into the orbit of its 
critical reach. But while it engaged profoundly with economic discourse in this vein, 
it had the paradoxical effect of excluding the economy from its critical operation. 
The economy remains invisible if measured against the critical visibilities Foucault 
has elsewhere produced. Two reasons for this invisibility have been singled out. The 
first consists in the persistent asymmetry ingrained within the concept of govern-
mentality itself. While economic discourse is de-essentialized in the governmental 
account of the state, the economy does not become the object of an “analytics of 
power” in its own right. Of course, the proliferation of strategies of “conducting 
conduct”—which work through techniques of responsibilization, evaluation, and 
choice—can be detected within the public and private realm alike. This is not, how-
ever, equivocal to understanding the artifice of economic forms, which produce spa-
tialities, temporalities and epistemologies of valuation. The second argument about 
the invisibility of the economy within governmentality has concerned itself with 
Foucault’s reading of the “invisible hand”. The liberal trope of the invisible econ-
omy, as it turns out, answers to different “politics of truth”. While it might have ef-
fectively barred “economic sovereignty”, it has also been invested with a prohibition 
to envision and to theorize, however uncertain and contested. In this regard, Fou-
cault accepts and operates within this view of the market as the paramount and in-
visible machine of knowledge production.  
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If one were not afraid of overstating one’s case, one could say that the con-
cept of governmentality has to be guarded against the double danger of seeing like a 
state and of seeing like a market. Fortunately, Foucault’s toolbox offers the appro-
priate safeguards itself.  
 
 
